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AFTER THE ELECTIONS

Vladimir SIMIĆ

Vice-president of the Federal People's Assembly

IN GIVING a political assessment of the elections for the Federal People's Assembly and for the Assemblies of the People's Republics of March 23 and 26, 1958, it is not enough to take into account only the high percentage of electors who came to the polls and voted for the nominated candidates — although this fact, too, clearly reaffirmed the moral and political unity of the Yugoslav people and their real support to the united programme; one must also consider the events which took place during the election campaign, i. e. from the dissolution of the previous parliament to the election day. The nomination of candidates which, under the electoral law, is carried out by the electors themselves in all the phases provided by law, was completed by the citizens without any participation of organs of the state administration and wit-

hout any influence of prospective candidates. Thousands of meetings of electors, took place first to elect delegates to the nomination commissions in every constituency, and then again to consider the proposals of these commissions, to accept or reject their proposed candidates. At all these meetings the direct initiative and will of the electors came to expression, not only in regard to the nomination of candidates, but also in regard to a number of social, political and other problems that were freely and openly discussed in that period. These meetings, at which broad masses of people came to full expression and at which spontaneity was the motive power of every initiative, greatly influenced Yugoslav public opinion, increasing the interest of ordinary people in the country's parliamentary elections and other affairs. It can be freely said that the e-

lection campaign this time surpassed the campaign at all previous elections — not only in the number of political conferences and meetings, but also in the essence of debates and the quality of discussion that were initiated by the voters.

A discussion of the political role of the Federal People's Assembly dominated the election campaign. This was probably the result of the fundamental and profound changes which had been made in our social and political order on the basis of the Constitutional Law of January, 13, 1953, which is, in fact, the second Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. These changes started a thorough social and political movement, which, as people justly say, was the turning point in social progress and in the development of social socialist relations in Yugoslavia.

Since these changes came as a result of the work and activity of the third Federal People's Assembly, it is understandable why the Assembly's work was the subject of particular interest during the lively election campaign. This can really be understood if one bears in mind that the said changes were only formally sanctioned by the new constitutional provisions, that they were made on the basis of new laws. The extensive legislative working people in which the Assembly was consequently the chief subject of attention in the days prior to the elections. Shortly said, Yugoslavia's own road towards socialism was thoroughly discussed.

In relations to the Federal People's Assembly these constitutional changes came to expression in two directions. First, the Assembly itself had to develop into a new type of working political body with a leading role in the machinery of government, and, second, it had to assume an active and creative part in the life of the country. In other words, the so-called parliamentary rule was established, i. e. an organization of the government of the working people in which the Assembly became the fundamental political institution and the government its executive organ which is entrusted with the execution of the assembly's executive functions.

The principles of socialist democracy were the political foundations of this constitutional reform. The implementation of these principles was also regulated by laws, i. e. the Assembly's legislative work. It is important to underline that the essential new step in this was the introduction in the Federal People's Assembly, in addition to the Federal Council the political representative chamber, also the second chamber, the Council of Producers as a social and political representative body of the working class, i. e. working people. The foundation of this institution is the conception that the direct producers are the creators of wealth, the creators of the material basis of society, and that, as such, they must enjoy special rights and shoulder special responsibilities in the development of the country's economy and socialist economic organizations. From the organizational point of view, the introduction of this chamber in the Assembly strengthened the role of the working class in the political organization of the society in the transition period from capitalism to so-

cialism in which the means of production belong to the community. From the ideological point of view, the chamber was essential to ensure what is necessary to promote socialism, and that is the creation of a society where no man cannot be exploited by another man, where every one lives on his own earnings, where every one works according to his abilities and receives according to his work.

The question of the management of production inevitably arises in a society in which the means of production belong to the community. Closely linked with this is the question of the producers' participation in the distribution of the social product, i. e. the national income. Without the participation of producers in the use and distribution of surplus value there could be no talk about socialism or socialist social relations at all. In this, the extent of this participation of producers in the management and distribution of the national income is not of essential importance. What is important is that we have embarked on this road of development, that we are going on resolutely, and that new democratic forces have been set in motion in this direction. And it was at these elections that all these fundamental and essential conceptions of socialism and of the socialist economic organization in general came to expression.

Further, the self-management of the working people is the essential foundation of socialist democracy. The Constitutional Law did not elaborate this system in detail. It had to be elaborated and implemented by special laws. It is essential that this principle has been laid down as the foundation of the new social and political order. In our practice, it includes the self-management of producers in their economic enterprises and the self-government of citizens in local territorial units — communes and districts, — as well as in public services and institutions. The previous Assembly, just as the newly elected one will do, worked on the elaboration of the essential principles of socialist democracy and on the perfecting of the essential instruments for the strengthening of the socialist economic organization under public ownership of the means of production. With this work, the Assembly at the same time acted, socially and politically, as the highest organ of government in the Federation, and not only as a legislative bo-

dy. It is with this that we can explain the fact that the work of the Assembly was so thoroughly discussed during the election campaign, that the debates on its future tasks were usually illustrated by the previous legislative work which determines the future tasks.

Since the commune, as the chief self-governing socialist territorial unit, has become the foundation of the social and political order of the country, it was necessary to determine, by law, its material basis and structure. This was done by the Law on the Competencies of Municipalities and Districts of 1955. In order to implement the principles of social management of public services and other affairs of general interest which can be publicly administered at the present level of development, it was necessary to settle a series of principled questions. First of all, it was necessary to determine the services and institutions in which public management can be introduced at present. It was decided that this could be done in the fields of culture, education and science, in medical and social insurance services, and, following the enactment of relevant laws 1954 and 1955, public administration bodies were formed in universities, schools, theaters, film companies, radio stations, publishing and newspaper enterprises, social insurance services and so on. It was found possible to introduce public management in those fields of activity in which, in addition to humane endeavours, the freedom of creation is involved, and where administrative interference must first be reduced and then abolished completely. Finally, a series of new laws and regulations were passed on the system of workers' self-management in economy, whereby the whole system was further expanded and improved.

However, this process of establishing direct democracy through various forms of self-government did not progress evenly in all public services. The State has still to retain certain rights of control and even some elements of coercion and administrative regulation of relations must still be applied. Therefore, the third People's Assembly paid particular attention to the development of a number of new state organs. The same will be done by the new Assembly, but this will in no way check the process of democratization, of self-government and detatization in public services.

It is essential that the progressive development of our new society is supported by the masses, that the masses are becoming ever more active, that new democratic forces are being created which will always rally, not only the working class in the narrow sense of the meaning, but also all working people, and ensure the increasingly greater participation of citizens in the organs of self-government in all fields of activity and so strengthen

the machinery of the new social and political order.

The political unity of the Yugoslav peoples, as the chief achievement of the People's Revolution, is the best guarantee that the masses will, as before, extend their support to the policy of socialist Yugoslavia which, in both the internal and the external field, is based on the principles of socialist democracy.

And this is what the March Elections really confirmed.



OBSERVATIONS

AN OPEN BORDER

Dr. Aleš BEBLER

State Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs

SPEAKING at a pre-election meeting at Brdo, near Gorica, the westernmost Yugoslav district, I referred to several facts connected with the regime in operation on this border. These facts were cited in the foreign press, but incompletely. So it might serve a useful purpose if I repeated them here, adding some others in order to give a more accurate picture of the state of affairs on the Italian-Yugoslav border.

A little more than two and a half years ago, on August 8, 1955, an agreement was signed at Udine on the so-called „small frontier traffic“. This agreement affirmed the right of the frontier population to cross the border without passport and visa within a belt of ten kilometres (at one sector 15 kilometres). All that is needed is a special pass, with which a citizen of one country may cross the border four times a month in the course of twelve months, and stay on the other side — in the frontier belt — three days after each crossing.

This regime involves approximately 150 thousand inhabitants on the Yugoslav side and about 300 thousand on the Italian, as the Trieste, Monfalcone and Gorizia areas are much bigger agglomerations.

Do the people make use of this facility and to what extent?

Here are some figures on papers issued in the past:

	1955	1956	1957
Yugoslav	46,325	34,451	31,372
Italian	46,459	57,324	48,917

and below are the figures concerning the use of these passes. (Data on several months in 1955 are missing). The frontier was crossed by the following:

	1956	1957
from the Italian side	1,549,668	1,252,374
from the Yugoslav side	1,442,754	1,688,840

This called for an increased number of frontier crossing places. Of these there are 56 along the land border extending 343 kilometres, which means one every six kilometres. In addition to two railway lines, there are eight bus services connecting the areas on both sides of the border. On the bus lines, Yugoslav and Italian coaches run alternately, as and when necessary, sometimes three times a day. Only one line, Trbiž-Tarvisio, is seasonal.

What are the consequences of this traffic?

First of all, it provides possibilities for normal contact between the inhabitants on both sides of the border — contact which, in the main, had not

existed in this form. A series of family, friendly and other connections are maintained among the population in the frontier areas. As the one side consists chiefly of cities, while the other provides, entirely or for the most part, the village surroundings of these cities, this traffic meets the natural needs of the city population in relation to the countryside and of the village inhabitants towards the city. This traffic is also of considerable economic significance for the frontier population. The pass enables the holder to take with him something over 3,000 dinars or lire, in goods or currency, so that he can buy smaller quantities of industrial goods or farm products. In order to complete the picture, we should add that, besides this retail trade, larger quantities of goods are also in the sold in the frontier area. Special agreements have been signed establishing commodity lists and goods exchanges atmosphere thus created. Inaccurate nars in value.

The most important and, politically, the most significant result of this regime in the border area is, however the atmosphere thus created. Inaccurate ideas about the situation on the other side of the border have disappeared. People from both sides have met again as human beings, despite everything that separated them in the past and that still separates them. In public places on our side of the border one hears Italian singing, while Slovene songs are heard on the Italian side. Circles for the study of the language of the neighbouring nation are being spontaneously formed.

And all this is happening on the border of two states with different social systems, a border dividing two peoples who until recently, were in dispute over this same border. To say nothing of the last war...

Surely this is a good example how the policy of governments may lead to great success in the relaxation of international tensions, if it is directed to the satisfaction of the deep aspirations of people in our time.

THE MEDITERRANEAN PACT

L. ERVEN

THE French Premier's idea about the formation of a Mediterranean Defence Community is not new, although the variant is typically French. Already after the establishment of NATO, in 1949, there was much talk about the formation of a Mediterranean Pact, as a supplementary military organization of the Western bloc in the Mediterranean area. This earlier combination for a Mediterranean Pact had tended, in the main, toward incorporation of the Eastern Mediterranean area into the Western collective security system and at one time had enjoyed a certain political credit in Great Britain and Turkey — for different reasons in each case — but was abandoned upon the incorporation of Turkey, together with Greece, into NATO in 1952. — Spain, too, had a special formula of her own regarding a Mediterranean Pact whose core would be made up of a Spanish—Arab political alliance and which, in an indirect way, would bring Spain into the Western collective security system. Now, again, merely in the form of hint for the time being, it is France assuming the initiative. The French proposal relates to the Western Mediterranean area but it mainly has North Africa in mind.

The appearance of various combinations with a Mediterranean Pact has been made possible by NATO's incompleteness in the Mediterranean. In its original framework, NATO did not cover the whole Mediterranean area. Of the Mediterranean countries only France and Italy had joined NATO, unless one also counted Portugal whose significance and position are peripheral. And even France and Italy had found themselves in NATO on the strength of their geographic position, primarily in the continental part of the Atlantic system. Spain had not been admitted to NATO. The whole eastern half of the Mediterranean had remained outside NATO. Neither had the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea been territorially included in the Atlantic community, except for Algeria, in her capacity of French overseas departments. At that time the independent North-African states of Morocco, Tunisia and Libya still were non-existent, and NATO did not include the territories under protectorate. But bases of different Atlantic powers had been established there; for example, American bases in Morocco, French in Tunisia and Morocco, British and, subsequently, American bases in Libya. The Mediterranean Sea itself, as a communication line, was covered by the Atlantic system only in an indirect way, through the protection of the Allied fleet, air force and island naval bases.

The first idea about a Mediterranean Pact had emerged parallel with the first plans for extending NATO to the Eastern Mediterranean area. Two theses had appeared about extending the Atlantic system: to do this directly, by including the relevant states into NATO, or indirectly, by establishing a special Mediterranean Pact which would be organically linked with NATO. The thesis about a special pact was favoured by countries possessing their built-up positions in the Mediterranean and the Near East area and which might be weakened, or even eliminated, by NATO. However, the first thesis came to prevail then, the thesis of direct extension, and it was applied in the case of Greece and Turkey, while the idea of forming a special Mediterranean Pact was shelved.

A revival of the Mediterranean Pact idea — even if under a different name — was witnessed parallel with a constant compounding of the Western power's difficulties, especially of France, with North Africa. A Mediterranean Defense Community represents a formula for solving the problem of North Africa in relation to France by invoking the Western security system.

Albeit these two combinations have differed, they still had one thing in common. Officially they were motivated by the needs and interests of mutual defense; in reality, though, their aim was far less — and perhaps not at all, save indirectly — to supplement the system of mutual defense, and for more to establish a special instrument to facilitate realization of the special political designs of the countries sponsoring them. In other words, their common feature is this discrepancy between the formula employed and the actual objectives. A Mediterranean Pact was to have served the interests of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and the Near East — and the Mediterranean Defense Community should serve the interests of France in North Africa.

With Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and, at that time, Suez, the Mediterranean had constituted for Great Britain the basis of her traditional naval policy and the foundation of her prestige as a naval and, by that token, her position as a great power. However, NATO had rendered problematic such a leading position of hers in the Mediterranean due to the advantages it afforded to U.S.A. as a new naval factor in the same area. Already in the opening period of organizing the individual sectors of the Atlantic Command the British had evidenced a sensitivity over the question of the composition of the commanding corps and the division of competencies in the Mediterranean Naval Command. But more than by the question of naval command, perhaps, Great Britain was troubled by NATO in the Near East when the question of including Greece and Turkey came up. For Great Britain, the question of Turkey was particularly important because Turkey's accession to NATO meant an extension of this Organization, and thus of U.S. influence, too, as its leading power, to the Near East and its penetration into the system of British positions in that area. Due to this, Great Britain long resisted the demand for Turkey's admission to NATO. As a substitute for NATO, she suggested an extension of the guaranties from the Anglo-French-Turkish military alliance from prewar by including some other Mediterranean countries as well. Actually, a special Mediterranean Pact was in question in which Great Britain would be the leading factor and which would delimitate British and American influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. None the less, this whole matter did not go beyond conversations and it lost currency when Turkey and Greece became included in NATO thanks to American efforts. Looking back at the developments in the Near Eastern area during recent years, one readily sees that the hidden rivalry there between America and Great Britain, which became quite clearly manifest in the last years particularly, was actually inaugurated with the entry of U.S.A., via Turkey and NATO, into that area.

Today Turkey probably is one of the staunchest followers of American Atlantic policy in the whole Atlantic Organization. However, her admission to NATO did not go

smoothly. Her application was rejected on two occasions. Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries and France were opposed to her admission. Beside the above British reasons, this resistance toward Turkey was motivated by her dangerous geographic situation and the tense nature of her relations with the Soviet Union. Only through Turkey did the North Atlantic Treaty organization come to the borders of the Soviet Union for the first time. In addition, the Scandinavian countries had considered that Turkey could not come into consideration for NATO membership whether by geographic or ideological-political criteria, being outside the territorial framework of NATO and belonging not to countries of the „Christian civilization“. (The Turkish public was revolted by such arguments).

The difficulties met by Turkey over the question of her inclusion in NATO had influenced her orientation toward a special Mediterranean Pact which would be within the complex of the general Western collective security system. Having adopted the conception of a Mediterranean Pact in an emergency — she then proceeded to find virtues in it too. One virtue would lie in the fact that a Mediterranean Pact would offer to Turkey the same guaranties of security as NATO by dint of being linked with the last, while involving fewer obligations regarding the Turkish contribution to mutual defense. However, notwithstanding these qualities which in Turkey were recognized to a Mediterranean Pact especially with the Republican Party was in power there, Turkey soon abandoned this idea, doing so the moment her prospects of admission to NATO had improved thanks to American engagement.

In all these combinations about a special pact in the Mediterranean area Spain was taken into consideration as a prospective member. Through a Mediterranean Pact she would simultaneously be drawn, actively too, into the military system of the Western bloc, being also admitted to NATO through the backdoor when she could not enter it through the front door due to the boycott of Franco's regime on the part of NATO's European members, notably the Scandinavian countries and Belgium. But Spain also had her own special plan for a political alliance with Arab countries in the Near East with which she had certain traditions of political cooperation. There was a reciprocal interest between Spain and the Arab countries which probably constituted the basic motive in this policy of drawing closer. From the Spanish side, this interest has been manifest in Spain's tendency to break the international isolation into which Franco's regime had brought her. A political alliance with the countries of the Near East, whose international importance is constantly rising, would strengthen Spain's international position in the Mediterranean. From the Arab side, the interest consisted in winning Spanish backing for Arab policy in the countries of South America, upon which Spain has a certain influence. Recent years have witnessed livelier contacts between Spain and the individual Arab countries, yet the developments in the Near East have minimized the significance such a Spanish-Arab alliance might have had both for Spain and the Arabs in the earlier period.

Of all countries with an interest in the Mediterranean area U.S.A. has been the one least disposed toward the idea of a Mediterranean Pact. For U.S.A., the Mediterranean area represents one of the crucial factors in its system of collective security. By converting the conception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from a regional collective defense agreement into an all-embracing system of collective security, one ramified and linked with other regional pacts, in which U.S.A. similarly is the leading power, the Mediterranean would become one of the most important areas of NATO's military organization, especially in the system of peripheral strategy. Consequently U.S.A. did not accept the idea of a Mediterranean Pact which would disturb the integrated organizational structure of NATO. One reason, among others,

that the geographic principles of NATO — originally confined to the North Atlantic territory — were broken by including Greece and Turkey no doubt occurred in such an American conception about a unified organizational complex of NATO. Thus discussion on a Mediterranean Pact was cut short by extending NATO to those territories which possibly might have come into consideration for such a Pact.

However, the new situation arising in North Africa with the appearance of new independent states and of misunderstandings between them and the former protector-power, which is a member of NATO, had induced certain corrections in the American concept of the Mediterranean area's role in the NATO system, especially as regards North Africa, whose strategic and political significance has grown. Today there is a sufficiency of reliable indications that American policy — for all its restraint out of consideration for France — favours the idea of a North African Federation which would be within the complex of the Western collective security system. It would be unrealistic to assume this objective to be possible of realization either by directly including the North African states into NATO, which those countries do not want and which France would be likely to oppose, or without a previous settlement of the Algerian problem. Hence, it is not incomprehensible why the French Premier drew the inspiration for his idea about a Mediterranean Defense Community in the western part of that area from the the American suggestion that the problems of North Africa, in relation both to France and the Western bloc, be settled by way of a special alliance for mutual defense.

Gaillard's initiative for the formation of a defense community in the Western Mediterranean has been set forth merely in basic outline. The most rudimentary details are lacking which might provide a clearer picture, beginning from the very form of this community to its membership, its internal organization and its status in the Western security system. But even as a general idea it enables certain conclusions to be drawn from all the circumstances that have surrounded its emergence.

First of all, the idea of mutual defence — despite the name given to this organization — is not the guiding thought here. Just as Great Britain had desired at one time to defend her position in the Mediterranean and the Near East through a Mediterranean Pact so France today is anxious to settle her disputes with North Africa through a Mediterranean Defense Community. The coincidence between the appearance of this French idea and France's dispute with Tunisia and Algeria, on the one hand, and the Anglo-American mediation in that dispute, on the other, is neither accidental nor insignificant. A Mediterranean Defense Community affords no solution for perfecting the Western collective security system in the Mediterranean, but a solution which would enable France to win the Western powers over for her conception of the solution of the Algerian problem and the halting of national struggle in Algeria, while, on the other hand, stabilizing her disrupted relations with Tunisia and Morocco with the assistance of her Western allies. Within the framework of such a community, under the slogan of mutual defense, linked with NATO, and invoking Atlantic solidarity, France certainly assumes that she would be able readily to overcome resistances and win the full support of her allies by directly tying-in her policy with the interests of the Western collective security system.

Gaillard's plan is out of step with the American suggestion about a special political-military alliance in the Western Mediterranean which would solve the problem of North Africa within the system of Western collective security by the very token that it tends to solve the French problem, not the Allied problem, in North Africa. Gaillard has grafted French objectives onto the American idea. With this new Mediterranean Pact American diplomacy has experienced something similar to the Baghdad Pact. The Baghdad Pact, too, origi-

nally was an American idea, but Great Britain distorted the American conception of the Baghdad Pact by attempting to turn it into an instrument of British policy in the Near East. Due to this, U. S. A. had renounced the Baghdad Pact at first and only subsequently did it accede to some of its organs, compelled by the very development of the situation. Is something similar going to happen with this new Mediterranean Pact, provided that it came to its realization at all? Presumably the American idea was to internationalize the Algerian problem by way of a new Mediterranean Pact so as to mitigate the French national exclusivities which today are generally regarded as an obstacle to the problem's being solved within the complex of the Western bloc's over-all interests and its cooperation with North Africa. The uncon-

cealed thought of the French plan, however, is to keep the Algerian problem, with the aid of the formula of mutual defense, within the jurisdiction of French national policy as heretofore and to solve it within the complex of the national interests of the French Union. A defensive alliance in form, in its essence the Mediterranean Defense Community has been conceived as an instrument of French policy in North Africa. It has given rise to enthusiasm nowhere, and least of all in North Africa, for which it is designed. The solution promised by it would give the Algerians a substitute for the independence they are fighting for, and to all North African peoples for Maghreb, which is their common national problem.

Evidently such pretensions are far-fetched and unfounded.

ITALIAN SOCIALISTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

Giovanni PIERRACHINI

Member of the Directorate of the Socialist Party of Italy

THE FOREIGN policy of the Italian Socialist Party was always opposed to military blocs and strove towards the easement of international tension. Taking this fundamental principle as their point of departure as early as in 1946 when the Italian Socialists were united in the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity which took part in the government, their programme was that of Italian „neutrality“. They adopted the standpoint that as a workers party they may raise a broad range of issues such as the problem of relations with the labour movement in the East and West. However as a party which formed part of the government coalition they were for an Italian policy free of all obligations and not aligned in any military alliance. Consistently adhering to this fundamental principle they persisted in the long and difficult struggle against the Italian accession to the NATO. When Italy finally joined this pact they continued demanding that the narrow framework of bloc policy be abandoned. During the most difficult years of the cold war many considered the Socialists stupid Utopians, because they persisted in advocating the thesis of abatement of international tension and the conclusion of international agreements, while others attempted to disqualify them as „isolated“ from the western socialist movement and as „agents“ of the Kremlin.

The international climate began changing slowly and gradually. The Italian socialists are no longer in such an unenviable position as before. The far reaching changes have brought about a crisis in the policy of rigid bloc antagonism. The third camp consisting of neutral and independent countries, primarily those Afro-Asian began acquiring a prestige no one could have imagined ten years ago and became the fundamental element of international equilibrium at present. The plans elaborated in Teheran and Yalta are no longer adequate to maintain equilibrium in the world nor is the system of big power leadership sufficient to ensure lasting peace. The differences within the two blocs as well as the internal contradictions within them are becoming increasingly obvious. Finally, the international situation since 1953 is characterised by ever increasing dynamism and therefore requi-

res the maximum balance and the strongest possible guarantees against war.

Therefore the policy of the Italian Socialists against blocs and for their abolishment met with a very broad response.

The recent NATO session in Paris marks an important stage in the crisis of bloc policy. The opposition put up by a certain number of European countries to the construction of US missile bases on their territory implies the abandonment of power politics thus making the internal contradictions of the NATO system all the more evident. The repercussions of this crisis are also felt in the USA where severe criticism of Dulles foreign policy is being voiced. Even within the Warsaw Pact itself, the flexible and skillful action of the Poles shows, after so many years, a certain growth of independence which was unknown in the past and the existence of small power initiative which is yet another important proof of the crisis of exclusive and one sided big power leadership.

The present task of the Italian Socialists consists in extending their whole-hearted and maximum support to the process of overcoming the blocs with a view to achieving peaceful international cooperation. Every initiative should be endorsed even those aiming at the partial solution of outstanding issues, provided it would mean a step forward in this direction. In this manner as a party the Italian Socialists remain consistent to their thesis on Italian neutrality, express their readiness to support every initiative within the NATO pact which strives towards the abatement of international tension and stresses the defensive character of this organization as distinct from aggressive policy. The Italian Socialists have welcomed the decisions of those European members of the NATO which opposed the establishment of missile bases and demanded that the Italian government adopt the same line.

Having adopted the same positions, the Italian Socialists declared themselves in favour of the Rapatzki Plan, such as conceived, although they consider that it will be hard to limit the latter only to the countries foreseen. The problem of the atomic neutralisation of the Mediterranean and Middle East and perhaps also Northern Europe

will also arise in the foreseeable future. They are conscious of the significance of even the least success scored on the road to the abatement of tension. It is essential to alter the course pursued during the past years and embark on a new road which will sooner or later bring other significant successes.

For the same reasons, the Italian Socialist Party declared itself in favour of the British proposals as well as the proposals of the German Social Democrats for the creation of a neutral zone in Europe. It likewise endorses every initiative of the East or West with regard to nuclear disarmament.

The Italian socialists consider the movement of national liberation of the Arab peoples of the Middle East and North Africa positive and reject the French strong arm politics. The Arab national movement striving to create a platform of Arab independence in the world, and therefore constitutes a new force on the line of bloc abolishment, this being the case with all the liberation movements of the former colonial peoples. In this domain the peaceful policy of the Italian Socialist Party is continuing its sixty year old tradition of struggle against imperialism and colonialism including also Italian colonialism.

The Italian Socialists are in favour of a big power meeting and wish that the latter be most carefully prepared on both sides as a guarantee against failure. It is necessary to be moderate in the setting of aims and not

cling blindly to one's prejudices concerning the other partner. It is necessary on the contrary to find a platform on which it will be easiest to negotiate an agreement and concentrate all efforts in this direction. It would be most unrealistic to imagine that it is possible to achieve a solution of all problems which divide the blocs, while even the partial solution of some of these issues would open the way to other broader agreements.

In order to afford a complete picture of the foreign policy of the Italian socialists attention should be called to another important factor which concerns the role of the international labour movement in this action for peace. However the international labour movement is not united at present. It is therefore necessary to strive wholeheartedly towards the achievement of this unity of action of all workers being the most necessary precisely in the field of action for peace and the abatement of international tension. The achievement of an agreement and the accomplishment of unity is certainly no easy matter, but it is a cause which merits steadfast and persistent endeavour. The Italian Socialists strove, especially during the past year to strengthen their relations with the labour movements of the East and West: with the Yugoslavs, Poles, Soviets, British Labourists and Scandinavian Social Democrats. They intend to broaden their activities in this field, aware that it is only on the basis of agreement of all workers throughout the world that ways can be traced for the victory of socialist democracy which constitutes the ultimate objective of the global activities of the Italian Socialist Party.

Number of Participants in East-West Talks

R. KOZARAC

ALTHOUGH attention is still focussed, at the moment to the polemics on the various questions which would be discussed at the summit talks, another question namely the number of participants, has currently become the subject of official and unofficial study. If a list of problems were drawn up on which the greater or lesser success of the meeting at the highest level is contingent, it would be evident that in many ways two questions are also the most important: it is doubtless of vital importance what will be discussed at such an international meeting, but it is also no less important who will talk on the problems which concern the most vital interests of the international community.

"Big Two" Meeting The thesis that East-West talks would be the most effective if there were only two negotiators at the conference table, namely the representatives of the USA and USSR, should be taken in account in the opinion of many observers as it represents a potential possibility. The London *"Economist"*, the Canadian statesman Lester Pearson and even the *"Hindustan Standard"* declared themselves in favour of this thesis.

The arguments in favour of a big two meeting are mainly as follows: the major international problems of today derive directly from the relations between the USA and USSR, and none of them can be settled without their consent; the USA and USSR are the only two world powers at present which are in a position to deliberate on the fate of the world without

third powers; the participation of representatives of third countries as the talks would only be invested with a formal nature and consist merely in their solidarizing with the attitude of one side or the other (according to the *"Economist"*, the third parties would at best be guests, and at worst pawns or obstacles).

Although no one can deny the particular responsibility of the USA and USSR for the improvement or deterioration of the international situation and their decisive influence on the solution of given international problems, nonetheless at least two essential objections can be advanced concerning the big two meeting.

The first is of a principled character which does not preclude the benefits of bilateral contact between the two powers, nor the positive effects which could ensue on the international plane from the increase of their mutual confidence and rapprochement would consist in the following: the problems which would be discussed at the summit talks would concern the whole international community; diplomatic history has shown that *"exclusive clubs"* of big powers since the Holy Alliance to date were often based exclusively on spheres of interest and brought decisions which were detrimental to the other members of the international community; the increasing application and affirmation of democratic principles and methods in international life led to the active and co-equal participation of an ever increasing number of members of the international

community in the deliberation of problems of a general significance and have become a factor which can no longer be bypassed or ignored;

The second objection, — of a practical nature but of immense significance, — bears in mind the real state of affairs in big power relations; the discouraging picture of contradictions in their treatment of a given number of crucial issues. The top level meeting could only bear fruit if a rapprochement of the views of the big powers is brought about. The way certainly does not lie in the capitulation of one before the other, but in the alleviation of differences and the negotiation of an agreement. A glance at a series of questions that were positively resolved since the end of World War II and which were characterized by serious differences in the views of the parties concerned would show that many were removed from the agenda precisely by the activities and efforts of mediators.

The summit meeting without the presence of third countries which could play the role of mediator, or whose attitudes would lie somewhere between the extremes of the two big powers would have far less prospects of success than a meeting at which a broader circle of participants would be represented.

Big Four Meeting It may be said that this thesis is a result of historical inertia. The „Big Four“ are a concept which stems from a given wartime and post war constellation which is no longer existent. In this sense the opinion of the „Christian Science Monitor“ and many others is justified that the prospects of a meeting limited to the big four are very small. The British policy has lost the characteristics of mediator it once had, while for well-known reasons the French policy as long as it is unable to emerge from the present vicious circle is no longer even potentially constructive. Nonetheless if Great Britain (which is an important factor in international policy today as a member of the „hydrogen triumvirate“) and France (which will inevitably have to revise its policy, and which should welcome every fresh opportunity to do so) should rightly and justly, be represented at the summit meeting, then this argument equally applies to the thesis that a certain number of other states with the same rights and reasons should attend this international meeting. If a balance were sought, then the number of participants should be increased to six (Poland and Czechoslovakia are being mentioned as eventual participants). However if this equilibrium is a natural correction of the four power club, then it is not and cannot be an objective in itself, all the

more so as the countries whose independent political position could serve for the development of an efficacious intermediary action are lacking.

A *Broader Circle* of participants. Attention should primarily be called to the fact that the present world does not consist of two power blocs only.

The questions which would be deliberated at the highest level do not concern the two blocs only but the world as a whole. There is not a single serious argument which could, even from the geographical and political standpoint deny the right of the non-bloc countries to be represented at a conference which is reviewing not bloc, but international problems, which are bloc problems only in as far as they are created by the blocs, and because it depends mostly on the blocs whether they will be brought closer to a settlement and removed from the agenda. Consequently, it is not a question of the privileges sought by one country or the other which is not aligned in any bloc, but on the right of these countries to be represented at the meeting summit. To this right one should add another no less weighty argument, namely the *constructive* role which could be played by the non-aligned countries in East West talks. If in this phase a summit meeting is still uncertain, one thing is quite certain: the non-bloc countries which would take part in such a meeting would devote maximum efforts that such solutions be adopted which would dispell the dangers which threaten mankind in this atomic era. These countries have on countless occasions so far proved that by their constructive and flexible proposals and their dedication to peace and cooperation, they can play the role of mediator efficiently without which many problems would remain in a state of deadlock.

If all agree today that a meeting of the top-level statesmen of East and West must contribute to the improvement of the international climate, if this is the fundamental pretext of this meeting, then the by-passing of the non-aligned countries could only be considered as unrealistic or a move that is contrary to the spirit and aims of the meeting itself. It is entirely understandable that the non-aligned countries do not wish to impose their views, nor do they wish to intrude where they are not desired as participants and partners, but they are nonetheless vitally interested in the summit meeting, among other reasons also because it cannot be separated from the context of the persistent efforts they are making to preserve world peace.

FORTNIGHT IN THE WORLD

Bundestag and Atomic-Rocket Weapons

J. ŽIVIĆ

THE foreign-policy debate in the Bundestag, which was postponed several times, is significant, more because it clearly reflects the orientation of West-German policy and the gulf separating the conception and attitude of the Government from that of the opposition, than because of any formal decisions that might influence the course of events. This follows from the consistency of the Adenauer Go-

vernment in the implementation of its policy of demonstrating force and inflexibility, as well as from the relation of forces in the Bundestag, which makes the sanctioning of the earlier Government decisions more or less. It has also turned out that certain former divergences in the fraction of the ruling CDU — which appeared during Adenauer's absence from Bonn — did not affect the fraction's united stand

and its unreserved support to the Government during the debate.

Actually, the debate once more shed light on the alarming trends which have been displayed by the Bonn policy for some time past. This policy, formed during the sharpest cold war period, has consistently resisted the necessary adaptation to the desire for pacification and relaxation in the world, so that its intransigence has already become proverbial.

Although the central question in the Bundestag discussion was nuclear armament for the Bundeswehr, the attitude of the government and opposition, on current problems, already

known in substance, has been again formulated and set forth in precise detail. Wishing to balk the Opposition and try to justify his policy, Adenauer oriented the debate in such a way as to place in its centre the question of security while other questions such as the attitude of the government to the agenda of the summit conference, the peace treaty, the non-atom zone and reunification were pushed to the background.

The Government side clearly confirmed that the gradual arming of the Bundeswehr with tactical atomic-rocket weapons is actually already under way. In contrast to former debates and official statements on this matter, when it was usually stressed that nothing had yet been decided definitely, this time Adenauer and his followers openly declared that such armament is unavoidable, and that the Government had adopted it. The fact that an agreement on general and controlled disarmament would render this armament superfluous, makes no essential difference in this respect. The resolution finally passed by the Bundestag contains an emphatic statement to the effect that the Bundeswehr will adopt atomic-rocket weapons unless an agreement on general disarmament is reached between East and West in the next eighteen months. Thus the Government has clearly outlined its policy. The Government side in the Bundestag endeavoured to justify its decision by the well-known ideological arguments based on the alleged threat of aggression on the part of the USSR. It was also stated that non-adoption of atomic-rocket armaments in the framework of the new Atlantic Pact strategy would actually place Western Germany outside that bloc, a thesis denied by the Opposition who brought up the example of Denmark and Norway, who remain faithful to the Atlantic Pact despite their rejection of such armaments.

The above-mentioned general line of the Government has also been reflected in other problems. Brentano has declared that the Government considers the German question should definitely be examined at the East-West conference, and that if the USSR should disagree with this, the discussion on European security would produce no results, that the Rapacki plan — that is — the idea on the creation of a non-atom zone, is unacceptable etc.

The opposition set forth its views with unusual sharpness and conviction. It criticized the government both with regard to the negative consequences of its policy towards the international situation and with reference to the repercussions on the problem of German unification. Social-Democrats and Liberals displayed diametrically opposite concepts on the basic problems of West-German foreign policy. In the existing situation the orientation of the Government towards the atomic-rocket weapons means, in the opinion of the Opposition and a large section of the West-German public, not only the prevention of any progress towards the solution of the German problem, but also the creation of serious obstacles to the improvement of the international situation pending the summit conference. The Opposition again put forward its well-known alternatives, which would involve a change in the courage of Bonn foreign policy. The principal demands were in connection with the renunciation of atomic-rocket armaments as well as against installation of bases for guided missiles. The opposition is also in favour of negotiations on the non-atom zone, especially

with Poland. It was also proposed that the Government should take steps with the great powers for the revival of negotiations on the peace treaty with the whole of Germany, for which, as is known, the USSR has expressed its readiness. However, the efforts of the opposition proved unsuccessful, as the compact government majority sanctioned the government policy.

There is no doubt that the current trend of the West-German foreign policy definitely complicates and obstructs developments in East-West relations, at a time when the basic problem is how to achieve relaxation of the existing tension, that is, how to bring about a summit conference. By forcing atomic-rocket armaments for the Bundeswehr and by proclaiming the policy of force and rigid inflexibility which springs from the unrealistic belief that it is possible to impose one's concepts on the other side in this way, official Bonn not only withholds its contribution to the lessening of tension but actually opposes the need for such development and retains concepts which, while being devoid of any prospects, are often very dangerous.

Hands off Indonesia

N. DUBRAVČIĆ

THERE WERE often situations in the recent history of the Republic of Indonesia when it seemed that major changes are imminent on the political scene, but in spite of this the progressive rhythm of political life did not register any essential changes. The generation which freed the country from the century long colonial domination and wrote the first pages of social progress under conditions of independence was always able to muster sufficient force to overcome the difficulties and orient their policy towards the best interests of the nation.

Even if it is expected in some capitals at present where the international position of Indonesia is considered as a hitch in military bloc calculations in the Pacific, that the forming of a rebel government in Central Sumatra will lead a dramatic about turn

in that country, this is based on the hope that the rebellion on the Sumatra will meet with a broader response of the Indonesian people. However it is becoming increasingly evident that the roots of Sukarno's programme of national unity and economic emancipation are all too deep and strong to enable an irresponsible adventure to change the internal complexion of the country and divert its foreign policy from the road to independence. In spite of the economic difficulties which largely derive from fact that four fifths of investments in Indonesian economy still belong to foreign capital, — Dutch, US and British, — and in spite of certain shortcomings in the administrative system and mode of distribution of national income, the firmly traced basic line of development was never devoid of its steadfast, immutable continuity. Even if there had been

difficulties, this is an entirely understandable phenomenon which inevitably accompanies the growth of so young and specific a republic consisting of several languages, cultures, and traditions with widely differing levels of development and wealth between the numerous islands and the mutually remote provinces. The differences between the individual regions and the Central Government on questions of regional autonomy and some religious problems which took place for time to time (Atcheh, Northern Celebes, Southern Sumatra) marked various phases during the prolonged process of constitutional development and internal stabilization, but they never brought the principle of national unity or state integrity in question.

The present revolt on Central Sumatra is invested with an essentially different character than the previous autonomist movements. When they rose at the instigation of foreign factors against the Central Government, the Padang dissidents did not put forward any demands for administrative or economic reforms, but strongly emphasised the aim to overthrow the legal system in the country and radically change its foreign policy. As it was immediately obvious that such an objective vastly transcends their forces, the rebels later on adopted a minimum programme to disrupt the unity

of the republic, split one part of it from the Central Government, and place it, as a new Indonesian state, under the aegis of the anti-Bandung group of countries. When compared to the system of thought and expression characteristic for the SEATO Conferences, the language of the self-government in Padang leaves no doubt that a new Manilla twin is in question to which foreign circles are pinning specific intentions on the extension of bloc influence to the Archipelago region as well.

Such a character of the rising and its external connection behind the scenes also determine the degree of danger. If the Indonesian republic must pass through heavy trials at present, this is not because the rebels would enjoy the support of the population to any alarming extent. The government troops are not meeting with any greater difficulties when establishing order in the rebel area. However the danger for Indonesia, its security and territorial integrity as well as the threat to peace and security on the Pacific and Southeast Asia in general ensues from the fact that in this case a flagrant, calculated external interference in the internal life of a sovereign independent country is in question. As one of the great architects of anti-colonial, non-bloc policy in Asia, Sukarno was not spared various forms of economic pres-

sure and political intimidation. The present organization of disorders however with the obvious aim of causing of civil war in Sumatra, and protracted guerilla warfare under the pretext of struggle against communist policy of President Sukarno, marks the climax of the endeavours of the western powers to destroy the ideas of independent development and Bandung non-bloc policy on the vast area between Australia, the Philippines and Indochina.

The friends of Indonesia are following the developments round its frontiers with growing concern. If the duty of every government to respect the natural rights of other countries to choose their way of life and pursue its policy in accordance with its own national interests has been entered into the codex of principles governing international relations, then it is incomprehensible and impermissible that the US Foreign Secretary should allow for the possibility that the status of belligerent party be recognized to a group of rebels on the Sumatra which rose against the legal government of their country. It would be tragic for Asia and the world at large if that what happened twenty two years ago in the case of Spain would be repeated on Indonesian soil and again bring the world on the threshold of world war. The memories of Korea and Indo-

PERSONALITIES AND POLITICS

„COURT REVOLUTION“

IN THE last few years King Ibn Saud has been in the limelight of the news four times: first, when, during the Suez crisis, he acted as a mediator between the United States and Egypt; second, when he turned his back to Egypt, Syria and the Yemen and made peace with the Hashimites; third, when he was connected with a plot against Nasser; and now, for the fourth time, when he „abdicated partially“ in favour of his stepbrother, Prince Feisal.

In the border region between three continents, Ibn Saud is the protector of holy places and owner of the world richest oilfields. As a result, the Arabs and people who are interested in the fate of the Arabs have often asked themselves: What does King Saud think? More often then not, the answer to their query was uncertain, since King Saud changes his mind quite frequently. Therefore, people more frequently have expected an answer to a more concrete questions: What will King Saud do? If all the turns and changes in the practice of the son of the legendary „King of the Desert“ were to be analyzed, it would certainly be shown that he has been giving far more thought to his own interests than to the support of those trends and mo-

vements which lead to the unity and progress of the Arab nations.

After the discovery of the plot against Nasser, in which King Saud figured as the central personality, the above mentioned question was raised in another way: How long will Saud be the „champion of surprises“ among the Arabs, and how long will he be able to oppose the trends of Arab integration which are enjoying ever greater support of the Arab world. The news about the „court revolution“ in Riad shows that the march of time cannot be stopped, that the influence of the example set by Syria and Egypt is growing. In many respects, it seems that King Saud will rule but not govern in the future. Prince Feisal earlier on'y a figure head of the government and the foreign affairs department, has now acquired real control over the internal affairs and finances of the country.

What road Saudi Arabia will now take?

The differences between Ibn Saud and his stepbrother have long been known. Prince Feisal is for cooperation with Nasser. If the „court revolution“ should draw Saudi Arabia closer to a real Arab policy, then all will acclaim the developments in that country of feudal poverty and dazzling luxury.

China are still too vivid as to enable one to gloss over the fact that the rebels in Sumatra are being supplied through the puppet government of Taiwan by US made weapons. If the USA wished to act in accordance with the prescriptions of the charter they would not allow their Seventh Fleet to hold manoeuvres under such exceptional conditions, and display their might in the vicinity of the Indonesian waters. The reports that the rebel representatives are being received at the competent offices in Washington and Taipei in order to discuss the extension of aid also give rise to doubts and concern. It is also not incidental that during the recent SEATO Conference in Manila the participants received three representatives of the rebel centres, and that Indonesia, although not a point on the agenda of this meeting was always present in the thoughts and statements of the delegates. All these alarming phenomena are accompanied by a corresponding campaign waged through the press of the SEATO countries, affirming that the crisis on Sumatra cannot be an internal matter

of Indonesia, as allegedly the idea of contemporary Indonesia as a nation is only a myth. The propaganda machine of the countries which find Sukarno's ideas on the independent development of Asia distasteful, wishes to create the impression that chaos prevails in Indonesia thus seriously threatening the security of the Pacific region if third powers do not intervene and prevent the „expansion of the communist danger“. Such a pretext is really too cynical and clear, thus making all comments superfluous.

All that Indonesia needs at the moment is the abstention of foreign powers from interference in its internal affairs. The Government in Jakarta is both legitimate and strong enough to restore law and order in the rebel part of Sumatra, while Sukarno's programme of national solidarity, the rapid and intelligent development of the natural resources of the country, and an independent foreign policy coincides sufficiently to the most vital needs of the nation and therefore does not require any corrections from outside.

MILITARY COMMENTARY

France and North Africa

K. STANIĆ

THE ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SAHARA

NEARLY the whole of the French press has lately been publishing articles — reports about the enormous natural resources lying unexploited in the Sahara primarily oil), emphasizing that the Sahara holds many promises, not only for France, but for the whole world. This, action, it appears, has various aims.

Firstly, the Sahara is situated in the centre of French possessions surrounded by regions consisting of partly or entirely independent provinces. Only Algeria remains under French „control“, and the bulk of the French armed forces is concentrated and this region, which provides the surest and shortest connection with Sahara.

Now it is necessary to justify the waging of a war in this area, — a

war which calls for expenditures running into billions of francs every day, while proving to the opponents of this policy that the loss of Morocco and Tunisia will be compensated for by the much richer Sahara.

Secondly, by referring to the Sahara, which holds many promises for the world at large, the French wish to attract West-European and overseas partners to share, with their capital, in the exploitation of the Sahara, as well as to win the necessary support, in view of the invested capital, when the Algerian question is again placed on agenda.

For well-known reasons, France is unable to embark alone upon major works for the exploitation of the Sahara, and in order to bring this plan to fruition, she is providing possibilities for „cooperation“ to other inter-

ested countries. At the same time France undertakes to see that the territory of the Sahara shall not be threatened by the Algerian „Rebels“ and similar forces.

According to experts, rich oil deposits exist in the Sahara, and several American and British companies, in addition to French concerns, have so far invested about 300 billion francs in prospecting for oil there. According to reports, a Canadian company has also recently approached the French for a concession.

The business prospect of the above-mentioned companies would undoubtedly be enviable were it not for the war in Algeria, for in order to reach France, petroleum would have to be conducted by pipeline and by rail through Algeria and then loaded at some of the Algerian ports.

Simultaneously, the question of the exploitation of the Sahara involves several problems which France will have to solve without delay, primarily the question of the Sahara borders (demands of Morocco, Lybia, the rights of Algerians etc.) to say nothing of the presence of Algerian insurgents, which the French have started to „feel“ more and more strongly in the desert areas.

ORGANIZATION AND DIVISION OF THE SAHARA

WITHIN the framework of their general activity, the French carried out a new organization and division of the Sahara towards the end of last year.

In order that this may function independently and in safety, it has been planned to keep definite contingents of the armed forces in the Sahara desert, under the command of a general who would use these forces as he thinks „fit and necessary“.

The former organization of the region of Sahara was part of the general African strategy, and it was tactically under the control of units stationed in South Algeria as a branch of the command of the French armed forces in Algeria. There was no special independent command.

The new organization envisages the creation of a completely independent command, directly subordinate to the Minister of National Defence, from whom it receives all the orders and instructions. The northern part of Algeria, which is more densely populated and covers a smaller area, remains

under the control of the armed forces in Algeria, while the southern part of Algeria, which is less densely populated, but which covers a larger area, is under the newly-formed command. On the plane of general African strategy there will be a certain coordination between the above mentioned commands only in the sense of joint actions depending on the situation and its needs.

INDUSTRIAL AREAS OF THE SAHARA

THE organization and division of the Sahara on purely military lines is in step with the earlier divisions of the Sahara into industrial areas (Afro-European combines).

The following areas are now known to have been instituted:

First area (Algerian-Moroccan-Saharan) includes deposits of iron, copper, zinc and lead (Draa region), oil deposits (Salah-Berg region), the existing power and metallurgy enterprises, mines etc. (Djerada) and finally the central sector (Colon-Bachar region, an expressly military object) with rich coal deposits.

Second area (Algerian-Tunisian) includes industrial strongholds (Tebese region), military strongholds such as Bizerte, the arable surfaces of the Ores region etc.

The benefits which France may expect from such undertakings owe their background both to the military and to the political and economic position. Owing to the war in Algeria, the exploitation of the above-mentioned sites is still on a small scale, while the lack of railway and port facilities constitutes an additional difficulty. In this connection, the French are endeavouring to arouse the interest of their European and overseas partners in the construction of the Atlantic — Colon Bechar railway, which, with a length of about 2,000 km, would provide a connection of strategic significance. (Atlantic—Mediterranean).

Judging by all the circumstances, Sahara oil is one of the main reasons why France refuses to abandon war-devastated Algeria.

Supporters of the French policy cling firmly to the oil-areas in Sahara, imagining that these resources (as well as other ores) will recover the wealth, former greatness and lost prestige of France.

The first who reacted readily to this rediscovery of the Sahara — a region which has been neglected for a whole

century — were the financial circles, whose shares invested at the Paris Exchange in Saharan oil deposit, have lately been rapidly soaring.

The slogan „Algeria must be saved so that we may keep the Sahara“ is heard on all sides in France.

It is to be noted, by the way, that the franc and the dollar have simultaneously taken big strides towards the oil wells. American „liquid gold“ magnates have again been loth to leave in French hands the initiative of prospecting and exploitation.

COLON-BECHAR, THE „CAPITAL“ OF THE SAHARA

COLON-BECHAR, a town with about 24,000 inhabitants (including a approximately 10,000 Frenchmen), is the „capital“ of the African industrial organization (the first Afro-European combine) — a region which, in the opinion of the experts, is full of mining wealth.

The Colon-Bechar region has seen so far the creation of 23 organizations (enterprises) for the exploitation of the natural resources of Sahara, excluding areas and installations of purely military and strategic value.

In the post-war period the French in Solon-Bechar also started experimenting with rocket plants. Early in 1947, they set up a Test Centre, which developed successful work two years later. The Test Centre in question is for guided missiles (surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-air, air-to-surface), and has an airport and a nearby launching base, while the tactical testing base is 50 km south of the town. The space for operative-strategic launching has been laid out about 100 km south-west of the town and has an empty space of about, 1,000 km to the West, in the direction of Tindouf, and an area of about 2,000 km in the south-west, towards Niger and Chad. The centre has at its disposal the necessary technical services and laboratories for atomic, physical and mechanical research, as well as the necessary radar installations and workshops of all kinds. The personnel consists of about 1,300 experts (engineers and technicians) including American, West-German and Italian representatives. The first atomic bomb of French make (as officially stated by responsible military-political circles in Paris) will be tested in the above-mentioned Centre towards the end of 1958.

MILITARY SITUATION IN ALGERIA

THE primary task of the French armed forces until three years ago was defence of French interests in the framework of the West-European blocs in Fumatra are being supplied coalition (NATO); the second was defence of the metropolitan territory from „subversive“ threats (internal and external), and the third task — ensuring the safety of overseas territories and possessions, including North Africa.

However, since 1955 the development of the armed forces has shown that their bulk is in the North African countries (Algeria primarily), the greater part of the reserves are in the Metropolis, a section is detailed for safeguarding the remaining overseas possessions, and the remainder is at the disposal of the West-European coalition (NATO).

The inverse order of development and the set tasks speak for themselves.

It is enough to say that the bulk of the armed forces in North Africa constitutes over 550,000 men, and that reinforcements are still demanded, as against 50,000 to Algerian „rebels“.

The French army leaders, ever since the beginning of the armed rising in Algeria, have displayed a remarkable ignorance of the situation, with efforts to catch up with events, and the taking of various measures and actions for the purpose of „saving prestige“, without believing in their efficaciousness.

The affairs of generals and their resignations, the promotion of officers by way of protection and adherence to one or another political group, appointments and removals from various important posts, military failures in the recent or remote past, bear out the foregoing statements.

All these facts are eloquent signs of discontent — of a crisis, which has been smouldering ever since the war in Indo-China. The latest events in Algeria have borne this out clearly.

To be more explicit, the weaknesses of the army and its commanding cadres reflect the weakness and contradictions of French policy as a whole.

In contrast to this, the army of the Algerian, „rebels“ is today a united, efficacious and disciplined force, with a single command and identical views. In keeping with the classical forms of revolutionary war, the last three years have seen the formation in Algeria not only of an army, but also of the

beginnings of a new form of state, with legal and semi-legal local authorities, courts, schools, health institutions, transport organization etc. The liberated territory in Algeria has been divided into six provinces, which at the same time constitute military commands and administrative units. In all instances, beginning with the provincial boards of administration and ending with the illegal city cells, the military and political organizations closely cooperate with each other.

WAR EXPENDITURES IN ALGERIA

ALGERIA was and is still the main obstacle to France's recovery, and is indirectly the main cause for the various recent government crises. The basic problem is, where and how find the money for the exhausting war in Algeria.

War expenditures in Algeria this year surpass the sum of 700 billion francs, of which regular army expenditures claim 170 billion, extra military expenses 390 billion, and losses caused to industrial and agricultural production about 140 billion.

The military expenditures incurred by France in Algeria, which are regularly allotted separately from other military expenditures, and are granted in retrospect in view of their specific nature and the impossibility of planning precisely in advance.

The present crisis of the French Government is only a detail in the general political, and economic crisis (the latter in particular), which has been systematically evolving for some time past, specifically under conditions of a relatively high level of production and trade.

A DEATH ANNIVERSARY

In Memory of Moša Pijade

Mitar BAKIĆ

Secretary General of the Federal People's Assembly

At 5 p. m. on March 15, 1957 Moša Pijade died in Paris. For one year now, the completing of the Socialist Revolution has not been assisted by one of its inspirationists, its movers, participants, leaders, by its fiery tribune and favourite personality. His death has left a gap which is felt by all of us.

The forty years of Moša Pijade's uninterrupted revolutionary work represent one of the most difficult and most interesting fragments in the history of the class, political and revolutionary struggle of the working class of Yugoslavia. This span, from 1918 to 1957, of Moša Pijade's revolutionary activity and life's path reflects and personifies all the trials and convulsive straining of the working class, from its tries, conscious, and unconscious, to win an existence of its own to the Socialist Revolution, its victory and the building of a Socialist community of working people. Every brutal and repressive measure of the monarcho-fascist Yugoslavia against the working class and its political movement had also been accompanied by reprisals against Moša Pijade, for he was one of the most outstanding personalities of that class and that movement. The fourteen years of Moša Pijade's slavery in Yugoslav prisons coincide with the worst class position of the working class, with tyranny and the misery of the disfranchised Yugoslav peoples. And yet, all efforts of the police regimes of prewar Yugoslavia to break the revolutionary spirit of Moša Pijade, to kill his tantalizing thirst of work and combat had remained vain. In the revolutionary vitality of the Yugoslav working class, a class for which Moša, as a thinker, humanist and politician, had a profound feeling, lay the sources of his fearlessness and revolutionary insubordination.

This deep cognizance of his for the position and historical mission of the working class and his close allegiance to the struggle of the proletariat has stemmed from the philosophical, Marxist theoretical comprehensions which had concentrated themselves in Moša's physically small, tiny personality. This frail physical constitution has withstood all vilifications, humiliations and tortures of a grim system and times just because it was ever alert, guided by revolutionary ideas. The force of his spirit and intellect transcended his physical strength and capacity. This thinned nature of its ranks and its division, then what aroused our admiration and which shall serve the generations of today and tomorrow as a brilliant example how to fight for the cause of the working class, for the cause of Socialism.

Under pressures and the terror of insatiable grabbers and raging capitalists, and due to the exceptional conditions in which the working class was finding itself, its political ranks had become thinned out. A large part of its members had deserted, betraying the working class and placing themselves in the service of the bourgeoisie. This thinned nature of its ranks and its division, then opportunism, factionousness and treachery did not shake Moša Pijade, they did not blunt the sharp edge of his struggle. Dark solitary-confinement cells and heavy chains never weaken his spirit and fetter his lively, resilient and swift revolutionary thinking. He has ceaselessly thought and fought for the cause of the working class.

Moša Pijade has always stood in the centre of ideas of the most progressive wing of the Yugoslav working class, in the core of its revolutionary directing collective. His intellectual and political activity has always moved within the wide framework of internationalism, along the

line of interests of brotherly and revolutionary solidarity of the international proletariat. Such a remarkable figure in the labour movement always had a sufficient reserve of moral and political strength to transcend the times, to include itself into more modern conceptions, to act toward the development of new and fresh revolutionary forces. Moša Pijade was only a Yugoslav, but an international personality. His work constitutes a serious contribution to the struggle of the international working class.

Conscious of the role of the working class in the liberating aims of our peoples, of the place and significance of the Communist Party, he used his long years in prison to educate and prepare cadres for the Party, for the Revolution. His greatest merit is that he had converted the prison cells into free tribunes of scientific thinking, into seed-beds of Marxist science and policy where the leading cadres of our Party were educated and trained theoretically.

Speaking over Moša Pijade's open grave, comrade Tito said: „In prison you have translated the works of Marx, you have developed a tremendous ideological and political work toward the consolidation of our Party, and you have converted the prison into a school of our youngest cadres. Also I have been among those who took from your hands the translated pages of „The Capital,“ yearning for that strongest ideological weapon of the working class.“

In prison a conspiracy was being forged against the unity and the monolithic structure of our Communist Party at the time of its ideological and organizational revival. In the breaking of this conspiratorial and factious group, headed by Petko Miletić, Moša Pijade had played a significant role, with the full support and authorization of the Central Committee. This can be regarded as one of the largest victories for the consolidation of the ideological and political unity of the Communist Party. This victory is all the greater and more important in that it took place in the period of the Party's direct preparations for the Revolution.

The liberating war of the Yugoslav peoples, in which Moša Pijade has been one of its initiators and leaders, had opened new and wide possibilities for his revolutionary activity. The serious warfare, and the victories realized by the nation in the Socialist Revolution with strenuous efforts, had made of him not only a talented politician and tactician of the Revolution, but a legislator. The

subtle nature of the artist and eruptive revolutionary knew to find a deep and extraordinary meaning and expression in legislative activity. For Moša Pijade, however, legal prescripts did not represent formulae and the conservation of a condition, but motive elements serving to warm the Revolution further and speed its development. Each victory won in our Socialist Revolution has found its stamp in the legal prescripts whose principal creator was Moša Pijade. Beginning from the Foča Prescripts on the People's Liberation Committees and the decisions of the First and Second Sessions of the Anti-fascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia to the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and other laws, which make up the legalistic base of our Socialist system, everywhere the hand and thought of Moša Pijade had been present.

In the conflict with the Cominform, with the canonized dogmatics and Stalin's aggressive undertaking, our Party and Revolution had Moša Pijade in the front ranks of the struggle for defence of our revolutionary achievements. The working people of the whole of Yugoslavia remember his fiery speeches and the words which had been hitting like arrows the inspirationists of aggressive attacks against Socialist Yugoslavia. In those political and ideological conflicts in defence of Socialist Yugoslavia and her national independence our Marxist thinking did not mark time, but, abiding by the laws of struggle and its development according to Leninist principles, was refreshed and elevated by new dialectical conceptions, and it strode forward. To this defence and development of Marxist thinking and to the new practice in building Socialist Yugoslavia, Moša Pijade had contributed a great deal with his lucid spirit, bold ideas and indefatigable work.

Moša Pijade is not only a great and deserving personality for Yugoslavia and the international labour movement. Simultaneously his was an interesting intellectual nature which had freely moved, with great interest and a deep understanding, in all domains of humanistic sciences. Such a free and forceful intellectual figure, free from all conformities and prejudices, could only have grown in the lap of the most progressive and the most revolutionary part of the working class — in the ranks of the Communist Party. Our Party is proud to have had in its ranks and in directive core a personality like comrade Moša Pijade.

Our New Contributors

MOMA MARKOVIĆ, M. P. member of the Federal Executive Council and of the Central Committee of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia.

In the first post-war Serbian government he was Minister of the Interior, then President of the Control Commission of Serbia, President of the Main Cooperative Association of Yugoslavia, member of the Presidium of the Federal People's Assembly and Secretary of the Federal Council of the Federal Assembly.

GIOVANNI PIERRACHINI, publicist, Doctor of Laws, M. P., and member of the Directorate of the Socialist Party of Italy.

DIPLOMATIC DIARY

March 24 — President Tito received the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to Yugoslavia, Hoang Van Tien, who presented his credentials. Present at this ceremony was Koča Popović, the Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

March 24 — President Tito received the Sudanese Plenipotentiary Minister in Belgrade, Bagir el Saed Mohammed Bagir.

VII CONGRESS OF YUGOSLAV LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS

Moma MARKOVIĆ

Member of the C.C. of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia



THE VII Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists will be opened on April 22. The preparations for the Congress are being brought to an end and the most important part of the work terminated: the delegates to the Congress have been chosen, the draft Programme and the proposal on the changes and supplements of the Statute of the Yugoslav League of Communists have been published. All the regular municipal and district conferences have been held in the spirit of the preparations for the forthcoming congress.

The preparations for the VII Congress have begun more than a year ago. All organizations of the Communist League have taken part in the preparations and enabled these extensive activities to be terminated on schedule. The electoral conferences of the League of Communists at which the results accomplished were analysed and future tasks set, provided the basic material for the draft of the Report of the Central Committee on the activities of the Yugoslav League of Communists during the interval between the VI and VII Congress, which served for the assessment of the road covered and the setting of the future course. Delegates to the Congress have also been elected at the electoral conferences. As distinct from the previous elections, delegates to the Congress were chosen at municipal conferences and conferences of elementary organizations of the League of Communists and economic organizations which number over 350 members. Thus the membership of the League took more direct part in the election of delegates to the Congress. The draft programme of the League of Communists and the changes and supplements of the Statute are currently being discussed in the organizations of the League. The objections and proposals are being submitted to the Commissions for the Programme and Statute.

The VII Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists is being held at a time of strong development of socialist democracy in Yugoslavia, great economic successes and other spectacular results accomplished in the international development of the country. The Congress further coincides with the further increase of the international significance of Yugoslavia, its growing prestige as a country which gave a significant contribution to the struggle for peace and international cooperation based on equal rights, at a time marked by the vigorous growth of socialist forces throughout the world.

The VII Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists will mark a major event not only in the life of the Yugoslav League of Communists but also the overall development of our socialist community. The Congress is to adopt an extremely significant document —

the programme of the Yugoslav League of Communists and carry out certain modifications in the Statute of the League.

The programme of the League of Communists primarily provides a scientific Marxian analysis of our socialist experience, the specific nature of social transformations both in the revolution and socialist development, opens and illuminates the broadest prospects of socialist development in our country. At the same time the programme analyses the most important experiences gained in the socialist practice of other countries. The programme likewise formulates the views and attitude of the League of Communists with regard to the most significant problems of international relations and the international workers movement, and especially the contemporary essential and principled problems pertaining to the development of socialism in the world.

The changes and supplements in the Statute of the League of Communists have been made primarily with a view to securing the further development and adjustment of the organizational forms of the League of Communists under conditions of fuller development of direct democracy, the broader possibilities for the development of initiative, independence and the enrichment of the working methods and organization of the League, which will on its part contribute to the still more efficient functioning and work of the League of Communists in the execution of numerous tasks. The Congress will likewise adopt a Resolution on the forthcoming tasks, namely the direct and current tasks which face the Organization of the League of Communists. The Report of the Central Committee of the League of Communists during the interval between the VI and VII Congress will provide an assessment of the results accomplished, while the report of the Secretary General of the League of Communists will formulate the most important tasks of the League in connection with the international situation and the progress made by internal socialist development in Yugoslavia. In order to examine these questions in the greatest possible detail, and enable the discussion it is foreseen that the Congress will work in commissions.

The interval between the V and VII Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was marked by many and various results accomplished in all fields of social life in Yugoslavia.

The VI Congress laid down the further struggle for the development of socialist democracy in our country as a task of prime importance. There can be no doubt that significant and decisive results were accomplished in this respect during the period under review so that

it may justly be claimed that social management and self-government constitute the social-political basis of socialist democracy in Yugoslavia, that the mechanism of socialist democracy namely the political system is being enriched by an ever greater number of novel forms through which the citizens are taking part in management and distribution. Contrary to the former administrative system, an extremely broad and versatile mechanism of socialist democracy was built, which by acquiring an ever broader variety of forms and novel substance became the fundamental motive force of further social development. The democracy for working people thus created has given still broader scope for creative initiative and the creative forces. Millions of citizens are taking direct part in the solution of many problems pertaining to every day life, such as education, public health, social insurance and other public services. Workers management and the new communal system represent an exceptionally significant socialist achievement whose foundations have been laid during the interval between the two congresses. Instead of the old administrative system when both the Commune and the enterprise were necessarily devoid of initiative for the creation of their own resources by developing their own productive forces through the more rational expenditure of the resources available etc., but received the resources required from the community, at present under the system of decentralization they are earning the resources required by the development of their productive forces. This at the same time ensures the material basis for the development of socialist democracy, the development of workers and social self-government. Nonetheless the fact remains that the conditions under which our country developed before and after the VI Congress, namely the difficult international position of the country and its economic backwardness required the appropriation of substantial funds for national defence requirements and investment construction and that it was therefore impossible to ensure larger funds and create a broader material basis for the economic organizations and communes. It is therefore understandable that they were unable to accomplish any particular results, which on the other hand affected the rate of development of socialist democracy. The above mentioned contradictions are being overcome at present and the harmony increased between the material conditions and tendencies towards faster democratization, namely between the increasing freedom of relations in economic life and socialist-democratic relations in society. In this way, as clearly demonstrated by our social practice, the representative and self-governing organs in various fields of social life will be strengthened, while the state administration will gradually be transformed into an exclusively professional apparatus under the democratic control of the elective organs.

Determining the tasks in the development of socialist democracy, the VI Congress at the same time defined the status and role of the League of Communists under conditions of struggle for the further development of socialist democracy and socialist social relations. It is only natural that under the different conditions the Party was no longer able to work in the old way. During the period of the so-called administrative socialism, the Party played a dominant i. e. commanding role. However under conditions marked by the development of

socialist democracy the communists were obliged, if they wished to remain the leading force of progressive socialist movement, to adopt new forms of work to develop political and social activity and provide an example in the execution of socialist tasks and the development of socialist relations. They had to develop a multifarious mechanism of socialist democracy which represented and represents the decisive obstacle to the bureaucratization of the League of Communists, while strengthening consolidating the forces of socialism in the struggle against various antisocialist tendencies. Under such conditions socialist consciousness acquired an increasingly decisive role, or to be more precise, became an exponent of the process of socialist development, functioning in accordance with the objective laws of social economic development and the interests of the working strata in general. Therefore the communists also shifted the stress of their activities to the education of the masses so that they also act and think in a socialist manner.

It is true, especially during the period immediately after the VI Congress that there was also a certain lack of understanding, distortion and maladjustment to its decisions, which either aimed at retrogression to old bureaucratic administrative methods, or at petit bourgeois spontaneous anarchy. All these tendencies, which were dealt with by the Plenary Sessions of the Central Committees have on the whole been overcome.

The Letter of the Executive Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists of February this year is channelling the organizations of the League of Communists to a still more consistent struggle for the development of new methods and style of work of the League, to the further promotion of the mechanism of socialist democracy and against bureaucracy arbitrary acts, squandering etc. the letter gave a still greater incentive to the strengthening and consolidation of the socialist system thus contributing to the increase of prestige and authority of the communists.

All these experiences will be summed up at the VII Congress and new tasks set. This will mark a new stage in the development of the Yugoslav League of Communists.

DOCUMENTS

Results of Parliamentary Elections in Yugoslavia

ELECTIONS for the Federal People's Assembly and for the Assemblies of the constituent People's Republics took place in Yugoslavia on March 23. Altogether 301 deputies were elected to the Federal Council of the Federal People's Assembly and 910 deputies to the Republican Assemblies.

On March 27 and 28 the Councils of Producers, second chambers of the Federal and Republican Assemblies, were elected. The Council of Producers of the Federal Assembly has 216 deputies, and the Council of Producers in the Republican Assemblies 541.

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Activities of Business Associations



Industrial and Construction Export Association — Zagreb

ADDRESS: TRG JOŽE VLAHOVIČA 2

P. O. BOX: 487

PHONE: 39-535

TELEGRAMS: INGRA — ZAGREB

The Annual Convention of the „INGRA“ Association held in Zagreb in April, 1958, was attended by the presidents of the Workers Councils or Managing Boards, directors and chiefs of commercial services of fifteen member enterprises, as well as the representatives of the state organs, banks and chambers.

The annual Report submitted on behalf of the Managing Board of the Association by President Božidar Guštin who is also the Director General of the „Litostroj“ Water Turbine Factory indicates that the business activities in the associated enterprises are progressing favourably, as the capacities available are booked for approximately two years in advance by the orders on hand, of which foreign orders account for about 12 percent. It is expected that the orders placed with „INGRA“ by foreign firms will be increased substantially.

The gross product of the associated enterprises reached the record level of over 40 billion dinars in 1957, while exports totalled about 4.6 million dinars. About 11 million dollars worth of business deals were concluded with foreign clients in the same year, although the general market conditions deteriorated appreciably in the meantime.

The principal export markets for the products of the member enterprises of this organization are India, Egypt, Argentina, Pakistan, USSR, Syria, Burma etc. while the most important items delivered

include hydroelectric plants, Diesel power generating units, equipment for the food industry, cranes, steel structures etc.

The prime task of the Association consists in the joint and coordinated design and projecting, construction and sale of power and industrial plants and equipment, so that most of its members are big machine building enterprises which built or took part in the construction of the greater part of capital projects in Yugoslavia during the past ten year period.

Thus for example the electric motor Factory „Rade Končar“ of Zagreb built over 100 power generating units of over 800 MW in all; the biggest units built were of 42,000 kVA while talks are currently in progress on the construction of units of over 100,000 kVA. The Factory likewise built all the heavy transformers for projects in which its units are installed, namely for about 4,000,000 kVA in all, as well as a large quantity of other electric engineering equipment.

The „Litostroj“ Water Turbine Factory of Ljubljana and the „Metalna“ Hydro-technical Equipment Factory of Maribor together with „Rade Končar“, belong to the group which specializes in the construction and delivery of complete hydroelectric plants. The first water turbines in Yugoslavia were built already a century ago, while the „Litostroj“ factory delivered various types of turbines with a total power of over one million HP during the past ten years. „Litostroj“ turbines

have shown a highly satisfactory performance, while the largest units delivered were of 75,000 HP.

The „Metalna“ Factory of Maribor celebrated its 35th Anniversary in 1957 and is one of the foremost manufactures of steel structures in Yugoslavia.

Together with the „Rade Končar“ Factory, the thermal electric group consist of the „Jugoturbina“ Steam Turbine and Diesel Engine Factory in Karlovac, the „Djuro Djaković“ Locomotive and Steam Boiler Factory in Slavonski Brod, and the Zagreb Steam Boiler Factory. These enterprises have a long standing tradition and their products are generating power in many enterprises and thermal plants in Yugoslavia. These enterprises manufacture some items of their own design, while others are cooperating successfully with well known foreign firms such as A.E.G., Babcock & Wilcox etc.

The above mentioned enterprises, as well as the „Jedinstvo“ Factory of Equipment for the Chemical and Food Industry, as well as the „Ventilator“ Factory of Cooling and Air Conditioning Equipment are the leading Yugoslav manufactures of industrial and mining equipment, such as complete plants for sugar refineries, cement factories, metallurgical equipment, chemical equipment etc. These articles are

produced on a larger scale than power generating machines and plants.

The „Prvomajska“ Machine Tool Factory whose products have been well received in Western Europe, and the „Trudbenik“ Compressor Factory of Doboj are also INGRA members.


This association also includes the following group of enterprises for planning, design, explorations and grouting whose work so far has earned them an enviable reputation:

„ELEKTROPROJEKT“ of Zagreb
„ENERGOPROJEKT“ of Belgrade
„ELEKTROSOND“ of Zagreb and
„GEOISTRAŽIVANJA“ of Zagreb.

Over 20,000 workers of which engineers and highly skilled technicians account for about 3,000, are employed in the INGRA member enterprises.

The results already accomplished, as well as the organizational measures required with a view to executing fresh extensive deals which are still in the stages of preparation and talks were also discussed at the Convention.

The new management of the organization was elected at the Convention.



Visit of President Nehru to the „Rade Končar“ Factory

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(Continued from page 16)

The official communique of the Federal Electoral Commission on the results of the elections for the Federal Council of the Federal Assembly reads:

FEDERATION: Of the total number of 11,328,085 registered electors 10,645,556 or 94.0% came to the polls. Nominated candidates received 10,296,239 or 96.7% of the cast votes. There were 349,317 or 3.3% of annulled ballot papers.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF SERBIA: of the total number of 4,787,751 registered electors 4,477,233 or 93.5% voted. Candidates received 4,342,225 or 97.0% of the cast votes. The number of annulled ballot papers was 135,008 or 3.0%.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CROATIA: Of the total 2,735,185 registered electors 2,590,350 or 94.7% voted. 2,483,729 or 95% voted for the candidates. There were 106,621 or 4.1% annulled ballot papers.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA: Of the 1,037,433 registered electors 980,247 or 94.5% voted. Candidates received 915,870 or 93.4% of the cast votes. There were 64,377 or 6.6% annulled ballot papers.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: Of the 1,760,256 registered electors 1,654,061 or 94.0% voted. Candidates received 1,623,663 or 98.2% of the cast votes. The number of annulled ballot papers amounted to 30,398 or 1.8%.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: Of the 753,491 registered electors 709,848 or 94.2% voted. Candidates received 699,507 or 98.5% of the cast votes. The number of annulled ballot papers was 10,341 or 1.5%.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO: Of the 253,969 registered voters 233,817 or 92.1% voted. Candidates received 231,245 or 98.9% of the cast votes. The number of annulled ballot papers amounted to 2,572 or 1.1%.

NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS

Trade talks for 1958 begun between Greek and Yugoslav delegates in Athens on March 17, and a meeting of representatives of the Salonika Chamber of Commerce and the Yugoslav Chamber of Trade begun in Salonika on March 19. The representatives of the Chambers of Commerce talked about problems affecting their trade relations.

A Yugoslav-Hungarian agreement on postal and telecommunication services was signed in Beograd on March 24, as well as a protocol on the expansion of telephone connections between the two countries. The Hungarian delegation to the talks which took place prior to the signing of these agreements was led by Ishtvan Kosh, Minister of Transport and Communications.

A frontier convention on the renewal and maintenance of frontier markings was signed by Austria and Yugoslavia in Vienna recently.

The Yugoslav-Austrian talks on outstanding matters in the two countries' bilateral relations, which begun in Vienna on February 25, are to be resumed in Belgrade in the second half of April.

An agreement on road passenger and goods traffic between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was signed in Belgrade on

March 21. At the same time documents on the implementation of this agreement were signed.

A meeting of the Yugoslav-Indonesian Commission for the Study of Technical Trade Problems begun in Jakarta on March 20. This Commission was formed under the trade agreement the two countries signed in December 1956.

CHRONOLOGY OF POLITICAL EVENTS

March 16 — The President of the Republic, Josip Broz Tito, who stood for the Federal Parliament in the Belgrade constituency of Čukarica, spoke at a large pre-election meeting in Belgrade.

March 17 — A formal meeting commemorating the 1st anniversary of Moša Pijade's death was held in the Trade Union house in Belgrade. The meeting was attended by President Tito. Petar Stambolić spoke about Pijade's life and work on behalf of the Executive Council of the Central Committee of the League of Yugoslav Communists.

March 23 — Elections for the Federal Chamber of the Federal Assembly and for the Republican Councils of the Republican Assemblies took place. A very high percentage of registered electors came to the polls.

March 26 — Deputies to the Council of Producers, the second chamber of the Federal Assembly, and to the Councils of Producers of the Republican Assemblies, were elected.

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